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Abstract. This paper examines business cycle variation in the earnings-returns relation. Earnings are more
persistent when growth rates are high (i.e., in an expansion) than when growth rates are low (i.e., in a recession).
Earnings are more persistent when production is high (i.e., in a credit crunch period) than when production is low
(i.e., in a reliquification period). Relatedly, earnings response coefficients are larger in expansions (credit crunch
periods) than in recessions (reliquification periods). Thus, earnings persistence and earnings response coefficients
are positively associated with the rate of growth in economic activity and the level of economic activity.
Prior research documents time series instability in earnings response coefficients (ERCs).
Lev (1989, 168) points out that instability in the relation between stock returns and earn-
ings calls into question the usefulness of earnings in explaining current returns. This
paper examines whether time series instability in earnings response coefficients can be
at least partially explained by “normal” fluctuations in business conditions. If variation
in earnings response coefficients can be attributed to changes in the economic environ-
ment facing a firm, then our belief in the usefulness of earnings is increased and our
understanding of how earnings disclosures are used by the market to assess firm value is
enhanced.
This research also speaks to financial statement analysis, the goal of which is the deter-
mination of the value of corporate securities by a careful examination of key value-drivers,
such as earnings, risk, growth, and competitive position. This study adds to our under-
standing of how securities are valued by demonstrating the impact of changing business
conditions on the market’s evaluation of accounting information. Similar to the conclusions
drawn by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), this study supports the importance of a contextual
analysis of financial statement information.
The macroeconomics literature is used to document how different stages of the busi-
ness cycle—expansion, recession, credit crunch, and reliquification—reflect variation in
the aggregate investing and financing opportunity set. Variation in investing and financing
opportunities implies variation in how the market uses information in earnings announce-
ments to revise expectations of future cash flows. This variation leads to predictions about
intertemporal variation in earnings persistence and earnings response coefficients (ERCs)
across business cycle stages.
Results from a sample of 53,324 quarterly earnings announcements by Value Line firms
over the period January 1970–September 1987 indicate that earnings persistence and ERCs
vary across the business cycle with changes in the aggregate investment opportunity set.
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Earnings persistence and ERCs are lower in recessions (when investment opportunities are
limited), than in expansions (when investment opportunities are high). Earnings persis-
tence and ERCs also vary across the business cycle with changes in the aggregate financing
opportunity set. Earnings persistence and ERCs are higher in credit crunch periods (when
the high cost and limited availability of external financing magnify the benefits of inter-
nally generated funds) than in reliquification periods (when external financing is readily
available and its cost is low). Investment opportunities are plentiful when economic growth
rates are high, and financing opportunities are limited when the level of economic activity
is high. Thus, these results imply that earnings persistence and earnings response coeffi-
cients are positively associated with both economic growth rates and the level of economic
activity.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Characteristics of business cycles
are discussed in Section 1. Hypotheses are developed in Section 2. Sample selection is
described in Section 3, and the method and results are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5,
a summary and conclusions are presented.
1. A Brief Introduction to Business Cycles
Macroeconomics is the study of the distribution of economic activity over time. Macroe-
conomists typically describe the macroeconomy in terms of an irregular pattern of expan-
sion and contraction in economic activity around a trend growth path, where fluctuations
around the trend are referred to as business cycles. Figure 1 displays the stages of the
typical business cycle. The remainder of this section describes how the investment and
financing opportunity set varies over time as the economy moves through the business
cycle from expansion, to credit crunch, to recession, to reliquification, and on to the fol-
lowing expansion.2 This discussion serves as the basis for the hypotheses developed in
Section 2.
1.1. Expansion
Since the U.S. economy is characterized by continuous technological progress, positive
capital accumulation and a steady increase in the working age population, the “normal” state
of the economy is positive growth. Therefore, no special explanation for the expansion phase
of the business cycle is required. Expansions are uniquely characterized by high growth
rates, but include periods of both low and high levels of aggregate production.
1.2. Credit Crunch
Eckstein and Sinai (1986) define a credit crunch to be a period of tight money and high
real interest rates. As Figure 1 shows, credit crunches occur around a cyclical peak in pro-
ductive activity and span the later months of an expansion, as well as the early months
of the ensuing recession. In early 1991, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
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Figure 1. A typical business cycle.
pointed out the significant economic impact of credit crunches when he stated, “We cur-
rently see the credit crunch as the most critical issue confronting monetary policy” (Busi-
ness Week, 1991). Crunches arise from a combination of loan demand pressure and
reduced supply of funds (Sinai, 1976). On the demand side, firms’ ability to gener-
ate funds from operations is insufficient to finance desired investment projects, result-
ing in curtailed investment and increased reliance on external financing. On the sup-
ply side, Federal Reserve curtailment of growth in bank reserves is often a contributing
factor.
1.3. Recession
A recession covers the period beginning at a business cycle peak and continuing through
the interval of absolute decline in the level of physical activity. As the decline begins,
businesses curtail spending commitments and adjust inventories. The size of the ad-
justments depends on the extent of revision in expectations during the period immedi-
ately preceding the peak and the forecast of the severity and length of the downturn.
In contrast to an expansion, recessions are characterized by low growth rates. Like ex-
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pansions, however, recessions include periods of both low and high levels of aggregate
production.
1.4. Reliquification
Reliquification consists of the financial restructuring that occurs during a business cycle
trough. A reliquification typically spans late recession and early recovery periods (Sinai,
1976), hence is characterized by a low level of economic activity. After a recession begins,
firms impose hiring freezes or layoffs, defer capital expenditures, and reduce inventories.
As a result, cash inflows increase and financial position improves. In effect, during a
reliquification, financial factors have an impact that is the reverse of their influence during
credit crunch periods. Financial assets are accumulated and liabilities are reduced. For
example, theWall Street Journal(1991b) describes the most recent reliquification, which
occurred at the end of 1991, in the following terms:
“The retirement of debt may set the stage for an economic rebound because it
frees up cash for companies to spend and puts them in position for another round
of financings which can be plowed directly into capital spending. Indeed, in a
disappointing year for the economy, the balance sheet progress of corporate America
is one of the few bright spots.”
Finally, as monetary policy eases and the banking system’s reserve position improves,
interest rates fall and the stage is set for a new expansion.
1.5. Measurement of Business Cycle Stages
Since the official labeling of business cycle expansions and recessions by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) occurs after the fact, NBER dates may not reflect
market expectations about unfolding business conditions. As a result, the recession and ex-
pansion stages of the business cycle are operationalized using one-quarter ahead forecasts
from Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), the nation’s largest economic forecasting firm. Since
DRI’s forecasts are purchased by three-quarters of Fortune 1000 firms and are frequently
used by state and federal government agencies in policy simulations, they should reflect
market expectations.3 Further, the NBER does not provide definitions of credit crunch and
reliquification periods. Thus, DRI’s ex-post definitions of these two stages are used.4,5
Table 1 displays the DRI model’s one-quarter ahead forecasts of expansions and reces-
sions and the dates used by DRI to define credit crunch and reliquification stages over
the period 1970–1987, the 18 years covered by the sample used in this study (see Sec-
tion 3). As a comparison, NBER dating of expansions and recessions is also presented.
Table 1 indicates that during the early 1970s there is a closer correspondence between
DRI’s forecasts and subsequent NBER dating than there is during the late 1970s and early
1980s.
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Table 1.Stages of the business cycle: 1970–1987.
Panel A.DRI and NBER definitions of recession and expansion episodes.
Quarters of Occurrence
Data Resource, Inc. Forecasts NBER Dating
Recession Expansion Recession Expansion
1970:1–1970:3 1970:4–1973:3 1969:4–1970:4 1971:1–1973:3
1973:4–1974:1 1974:2–1978:3 1973:4–1974:4 1975:1–1980:1
1978:4–1980:4 1981:1–1981:3 1980:2–1981:2 1981:3–1982:4
1981:4–1982:1 1982:2–1982:3
1982:4–1982:4 1983:1–1987:4








Using the market/book ratio as a proxy for intertemporally changing investment opportu-
nities, Collins and Kothari (1989) provide evidence that earnings persistence varies through
time, but do not identify the economic factors associated with this time-variation. In
this section, the description of the typical business cycle presented in Section 1 is used
to develop hypotheses about the effects of changes in both the investment and financing
opportunity sets on earnings persistence. Since time variation in earnings persistence im-
plies time variation in the response of equity returns to earnings announcements, hypothe-
ses about variation across business cycle stages in the earnings-returns relation are also
developed.
The two business cycle stages that represent variation in the aggregate availability of
investment opportunities can be characterized by time varying economic growth rates (high
in an expansion, low in a recession), and the two business cycle stages that represent variation
in the aggregate availability of financing opportunities can be characterized by time variation
in the level of economic activity (high in a credit crunch, low in a reliquification). Thus, the
hypotheses address how earnings persistence and ERCs vary with economic growth rates
and the level of economic activity.6
2.1. Cyclical Variation in the Economy-Wide Investment Opportunity Set
Economic activity is more efficient when concentrated over space. For example, it is cheaper
to sell cameras in midtown Manhattan than anywhere else in the country because the density
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of camera buyers is so high. Buyers are dense because Manhattan is a major emporium
for goods of all types and because there is a wider selection of cameras at much lower
prices than anywhere else. Economic activity is also more efficient when concentrated over
time. In fact, the assumption that “thick-market” efficiencies encourage the concentration
of investing activity during certain time periods underlies the temporal aggregation models
developed by Diamond (1982) and Rogerson (1988).
For several reasons, investing activities undertaken in an expansion are more efficient
than investing activities undertaken in a recession. Inventory holding costs fall during an
expansion because higher inventory turnover implies lower interest and storage costs and
may also result in lower depreciation costs for semidurables and lower obsolescence costs
for fad and technological goods. Selling costs are lower in expansions because a higher
density of buyers makes possible higher utilization of salespeople and facilities and permits
greater specialization. On the buying side, higher specialization of sellers and salespeople
and lower search and transportation costs mean greater efficiency in purchasing intermediate
inputs. For established purchasing relationships, expansions also imply lower transportation
costs.
Although the most obvious thick-market economies apply to selling, buying, and dis-
tributing goods and services, the economies extent to actual production as well. In an
expansion, components are available in much greater variety. Expansions are also charac-
terized by more specialized workers and services. Perhaps most important, workers and
facilities in expansions achieve higher utilization rates.
In a dynamic, competitive economy, investment opportunities that earn economic returns
are short-lived. A recession—particularly of the magnitude of the Great Depression—can
be characterized as the absence of networks that make possible the efficiencies associated
with high rates of economic growth. In the absence of these networks, it will be more
difficult for a firm to capitalize on investment opportunities and, consequently, when these
opportunities do exist, they will be shorter-lived. Earnings provides information about a
firm’s ability to find profitable investment opportunities. Since it is easier to capitalize on
investment opportunities in expansions, earnings will be more persistent in expansionary
periods. Thus, I predict that:
Hypothesis 1A.Ceteris paribus, earnings are more persistent in expansions than in reces-
sions.
Discounted cash flow valuation models imply that earnings response coefficients are a
positive function of the extent to which information in earnings announcements results in
revisions to expected future earnings. Support for a positive relation between earnings
response coefficients and earnings revisions (i.e., earnings persistence) has been found by
Kormendi and Lipe (1987), who estimate earnings persistence from univariate time series
models and by Easton and Zmijewski (1989), who estimate persistence as the magnitude of
the revision in analysts’ forecasts of future earnings in response to an earnings announce-
ment. The models in both papers allow persistence to vary across firms, but not across
time. By analogy, time-variation in earnings persistence implies time-variation in earnings
response coefficients. Thus, I predict that:7
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Hypothesis 1B.Ceteris paribus, earnings response coefficients are higher in expansions
than in recessions.
2.2. Cyclical Variation in the Economy-Wide Financing Opportunity Set
In perfect capital markets, economic decisions are independent of financial structure
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Current earnings are positively correlated with expected fu-
ture cash flows because current earnings signal the firm’s ability to find and exploit profitable
investment projects. In contrast, when market imperfections exist,8 access to financing in-
fluences the value of the firm (Meyer and Kuh, 1957), and current earnings also signal
the firm’s ability to internally generate the funds necessary to finance desired investment
expenditures.9 These market imperfections create a financing hierarchy in which internal
funds are less costly than debt, which, in turn, is less costly than issuing additional equity
(Myers, 1984).
Consider the impact of a cost differential between internal and external funds on the
cost of funding a given level of investment expenditures. When the cost of funds is con-
stant across funding sources (i.e., there is no financing hierarchy), a change in the com-
position of funding sources has no impact on the total cost of financing a given level of
investment expenditures. In contrast, when the marginal cost of an additional dollar of
investment varies across funding sources, an increase in the pool of lower-cost internal
funds allows the firm to substitute out of the higher cost sources, thereby reducing total
cost.
In the former situation, the level of investment expenditures is unassociated with the
funding source, while in the latter situation, there will be a positive association between
the availability of internal funds and investment expenditures. More generally, the greater
the cost differential between internal and external funds, the more sensitive investment
expenditures will be to a change in the availability of internal funds.
The cost differential between internal and external funds is greater during a credit crunch
period than during a reliquification period. Anecdotal evidence that banks tighten lending
during credit crunch periods comes from the Chairman of Continental Bank who, when
asked whether the 1991 credit crunch would ease if Fed policy loosened, replied:
“I don’t think lower interest rates will induce bankers to lend more. . .When a
large loan, say for $300 million, comes along now, our ability to organize a global
syndicate is poorer today than it was a year ago. A typical reaction of other banks
is that they don’t want more assets or they are now lending only in their own areas.
A lot of additional filters are applied”Wall Street Journal(1991a).
Consistent with this evidence, Harris (1974) finds that during tight credit periods: a) com-
pensating balance requirements are higher; b) loan maturity is shorter; and c) credit-
worthiness standards are higher than at other points in the business cycle.10 Additionally,
interest rate spreads between risky and safe debt widen (Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap,
1990). In contrast, during the reliquification period following a crunch, interest rate spreads
decrease and loan terms begin to ease, implying a lower cost differential between internal
and external funds.
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Less: missing realized earnings per share (3,402)
Less: stock splits and dividends (3,732)
Less: missing earnings announcement
dates (3,055)
Less: forecast date out of bounds (8,193)
Less: missing stock price data (4,486)
Less: trimmed observations (1,800)
Less: firm not followed by CRSP (5,207)
Less: missing returns data (8,007)
Less: firms with fewer than 20 observations (2,240)
Complete Sample 53,324
Since the cost differential between internal and external funds is higher during a credit
crunch period than during a reliquification period, investment expenditures will be more
sensitive to changes in the availability of internal funds. Internal funds vary positively
with earnings, implying an increased sensitivity of investment to earnings during credit
crunch periods. If there is a positive relation between current investment and future profits,
an increased sensitivity of current earnings to investment also implies greater earnings
persistence and higher ERCs. Thus, I predict that:
Hypothesis 2A.Ceteris paribus, earnings is more persistent in credit crunch periods than
in reliquification periods.
Hypothesis 2B.Ceteris paribus, earnings response coefficients are larger in credit crunch
periods than in reliquification periods.
3. Sample Selection
The hypotheses about earnings persistence are tested by regressing actual quarterly earnings
on lagged quarterly earnings and indicator variables that allow the regression intercept and
slope coefficient to vary across business cycle stages. Similarly, the hypotheses about
earnings response coefficients are tested by regressing cumulative abnormal returns on
unexpected earnings and indicator variables which capture shifts in the regression intercept
and slope coefficient over the business cycle. Variables which control for time-varying
discount rates and for cross-sectional variation in earnings response coefficients are also
included in tests of the earnings response coefficient hypotheses. This section describes
the procedures used in construction of the sample. These procedures are summarized in
Table 2.
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3.1. Definition of Unexpected Earnings
Hypothesis tests will be sensitive to error in the measurement of market expectations. An-
alysts’ forecasts are selected because they measure market expectations with less error
than do forecasts from time series models (Brown et al., 1987). Further, quarterly rather
than annual data are used to avoid calendar and industry clustering. Since quarterly an-
alyst earnings forecasts are not available in machine readable form over a time period
which spans several business cycles, I hand collected Value Line forecasts for all 2,208
of the non-utility, non-financial, and non-foreign domiciled firms covered by Value Line
over the period January 1970 (when Value Line first began publishing quarterly forecasts)
through December 1987. The data set contains earnings forecasts for 93,446 firm-quarters.
Since firms covered by Value Line comprise 96% of the NYSE and AMEX trading vol-
ume (Value Line, 1986), the sample is representative of firms on these exchanges. Addi-
tional information about sample selection criteria is discussed below and summarized in
Table 2.
To ensure a proper correspondence between earnings forecasts and subsequent earnings
realizations (Philbrick and Ricks, 1991), realized earnings per share were collected from the
first issue of theValue Line Investment Surveyin which the realization appeared. Realized
earnings per share were unavailable for 3,402 observations. An additional 3,732 observa-
tions were deleted because there was a stock split or dividend between the earnings forecast
date and the first date that the earnings realization appeared in Value Line. Earnings an-
nouncement dates were obtained from the Quarterly COMPUSTAT and Back Quarterly
COMPUSTAT tapes. Missing earnings announcement dates were hand collected from
theWall Street Journal Index. Earnings announcement dates for 3,055 observations were
unavailable from either data source.
Unexpected earnings per share (UE) are defined as the difference between the reported
number (from Value Line) and Value Line’s per share forecast, deflated by share price:
UEit = (EPSit − FEPSit)/Pi,t−1 (1)
where:
EPSit = realized earnings per share as first reported in Value Line,
FEPSit = Value Line’s forecast of earnings per share, and
Pi,t−1 = market value of equity per share at the end of the third month prior to the
month in which earnings were announced.
For each observation, the earnings forecast closest to the earnings announcement date, but
preceding it by no more than 100 calendar days, was selected. 8,193 firm-quarters were
deleted because no forecasts met this screen. Forecast errors were then deflated by price
(Christie, 1987), which was unavailable for 4,486 firm-quarter observations. Finally, to re-
duce measurement error, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the unexpected earnings distribution
were truncated.
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3.2. Definition of Abnormal Returns
Abnormal returns for firmi at timet (ARit ) were calculated as:
ARit = Rit − ait − bitRmt (2)
where:
Rit = dividend adjusted return for firmi on dayt ,
Rmt = equal-weighted market index on dayt , and
ait andbit = the market model parameters obtained from a regression ofRit n
Rmt over the 100-trading day period ending 60 days prior to the earnings announce-
ment date.
Missing returns data reduced the sample by 13,214 firm-quarters.
For two reasons, tests are conducted by cumulating daily abnormal returns over a two-day
period ending on the day that earnings are announced. First, Bernard (1987) documents
that the use of daily data reduces bias in standard errors resulting from cross-sectional
correlation in returns data. Second, the use of shorter event windows reduces noise, thus
increasing the power of hypothesis tests (Brown and Warner, 1985). In particular, the four
hypotheses examine how the relation between earnings and returns varies, conditioned upon
the market’s perception that the economy is in a particular stage of the business cycle. Using
a long window introduces noise resulting from changes in the market’s expectations about
the current or expected future level of economic activity.
3.3. Cross-sectional Earnings Response Coefficient Control Variables
Failure to control for factors that cause cross-sectional variation in earnings response coef-
ficients results in misspecification of the earnings-returns relation. Accounting researchers
have identified three factors that are associated with cross-sectional variation in ERCs.
These factors are summarized by Lipe (1990), who presents a discounted cash flow model
in which earnings response coefficients are positively associated with earnings persistence
and earnings predictability and negatively associated with the discount rate (which varies
cross-sectionally with firm-specific risk). Each of these factors is defined below.
Following Easton and Zmijewski (1989), earnings persistence is defined as the revision
in expected future cash flows in response to an earnings announcement and is measured as
α1, the slope coefficient from a firm-level regression of revisions in analysts’ forecasts on
(undeflated) unexpected earnings:
FEPSi,t+1|t − FEPSi,t+1|t−1 = α0,i + α∗1,i(EPSi,t − FEPSi,t|t−1) (3)
where:
EPSi,t = firm i ’s time t earnings per share realization, and
FEPSi,t |t−1 = forecast of firmi ’s time t EPS released by the analyst at timet − 1.
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Thus,α1 captures variation across firms in earnings persistence, but does not capture the
variation through time in a given firm’s earnings persistence that underlies all of the four
hypotheses. Second, earnings predictability for firmi is measured as the variance in firm
i ’s (unscaled) unexpected earnings. The higher the error variance, the lower the predictive
power of past earnings with respect to future earnings. The larger the forecast error variance,
the less predictable the firm’s earnings. Thus, the predictability measure is negatively
associated with earnings response coefficients. Third, variation in discount rates which
results from differences across firms in the degree of firm-specific risk is measured as
the slope coefficient (βi t ) from the market model regression described above. Firms with
fewer than 20 observations to measure persistence or predictability were deleted from the
sample, resulting in a loss of 2,240 firm-quarters and a final sample size of 53,324 firm-
quarters.
3.4. Time-Varying Components of the Discount Rate
In addition to varying cross-sectionally, discount rates also vary across time. Previous
research has identified four time-varying discount rate components. Fama (1990) and
Fama and French (1989) document that expected returns vary through time with variation
in the term premium, the default premium, and the dividend yield. Collins and Kothari
(1989) show that ERCs are negatively associated with the risk-free rate of interest. Con-
sistent with Fama and French and Collins and Kothari, the contribution of each of the
four components to expected returns in the earnings announcement month is defined as
follows:
T-Bill 11 = one-month Treasury bill returns, a proxy for the risk-free rate,
DivYield = the dividend yield on the equal-weighted NYSE portfolio, computed by
summing monthly dividends on the portfolio for the preceding 12 months
and dividing by the value of the portfolio at the end of montht , if dividends
are never reinvested,
Term = the term spread, defined as the difference between the montht yield on
the Aaa (Moody’s rating) corporate bond portfolio and the one-month
Treasury bill rate, and
Default = the default spread, defined as the difference between the montht yield
on a portfolio of 100 corporate bonds, sampled to approximate an equal-
weighted portfolio of all corporate bonds, and the montht yield on a
portfolio of Aaa bonds.
Standard discounted cash flow valuation models imply that the magnitude of the stock
market reaction to an earnings announcement equals the revision in expected future cash
flows induced by the earnings announcement,discountedat expected future rates of return.
Since the hypotheses predict time variation in the magnitude of the stock market’s revision
to expected future cash flows, at first glance it would appear that hypotheses tests should
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control for the effects of the components of time varying-returns defined above. However,
Fama (1990), Fama and French (1989), and Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) show that the
time varying components of discount rates are correlated with business conditions, and
Fama (1990) identifies three sources of time-variation: a) shocks to expected cash flows;
b) time-varying expected returns;12 and c) shocks to expected returns.13 Thus, inclusion
of the time-varying components as control variables could eliminate the phenomenon of
interest. To the extent that their variation is driven by changes in the aggregate investing
and financing opportunity set, controlling for them is synonymous with controlling for the
very factors underlying the hypotheses. Consequently, the hypotheses will be tested both
with and without these “controls.”
3.5. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents sample means by decile for key variables used in the analysis. Consistent
with findings by other authors (e.g., O’Brien, 1988), the unexpected earnings distribution
is skewed toward negative forecast errors (i.e., mean realized earnings per share are less
than the corresponding forecast). The mean persistence coefficient is 0.38, implying that
unexpected earnings of $1.00 results, on average, in a $0.38 revision in the following
quarter’s earnings forecast. The mean predictability estimate, i.e., the mean variance in
(unscaled) UE, is 0.07. As is expected from a sample which includes the majority of NYSE
firms, the mean estimate of systematic risk, 1.11, is close to one. The Dividend Yield
exhibits less variation than do the other three components of the discount rate.
Stages of the business cycle are measured using forecasts from the DRI model and DRI’s
ex-post definitions of credit crunch and reliquification periods, as discussed in Section 2.
Table 4 presents sample means for key variables (except the three cross-sectional determi-
nants of ERCs, which are intertemporal constants) across these four stages of the business
cycle. Mean earnings forecast errors (UE) are negative in all four states and are smallest in
recession and reliquification periods, suggesting that, in aggregate, analysts’ forecast errors
are not independent of the business cycle. Variation across the business cycle in cumulative
abnormal returns mirrors variation in UE. All four discount rate components vary with the
business cycle, but the variation in the Dividend Yield is slight. The one-month T-Bill
return is largest in recession and crunch states, the default premium is largest in recession
and reliquification states, and the term premium is largest in expansion and reliquification
stages.
4. Method and Results
4.1. Tests of Hypotheses 1A and 2A: Time-Variation in Earnings Persistence across
Business Cycle Stages
In Hypothesis 1A it is argued that, ceteris paribus, cyclical variation in the aggregate in-
vestment opportunity set implies that earnings will be more persistent in economic expan-
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Table 3.Sample means by decile.
UE CAR Beta Persistence Predictability T-Bill Term Default Div Yield
Decile Means
1 −.0360 −.0756 0.25 0.00 0.005 .0032−.0075 .0006 .0013
2 −.0095 −.0341 0.54 0.13 0.011 .0040 .0056 .0018 .0016
3 −.0045 −.0200 0.71 0.20 0.016 .0045 .0164 .0023 .0018
4 −.0020 −.0107 0.85 0.26 0.024 .0049 .0235 .0036 .0019
5 −.0005 −.0032 0.98 0.32 0.033 .0053 .0287 .0046 .0021
6 .0002 .0034 1.12 0.39 0.044 .0061 .0325 .0058 .0023
7 .0003 .0112 1.27 0.45 0.059 .0069 .0356 .0071 .0026
8 .0030 .0214 1.45 0.54 0.082 .0075 .0383 .0088 .0030
9 .0064 .0364 1.70 0.65 0.118 .0086 .0405 .0106 .0035
10 .0102 .0797 2.25 0.89 0.311 .0114 .0487 .0126 .0042
Sample Mean
−.0002 .0009 1.11 0.38 0.070 .0062 .0262 .0058 .0024
Sample Median
−.0000 .0003 1.05 0.35 0.038 .0056 .0302 .0050 .0022
Sample Standard Deviation
.0160 .0428 0.57 0.26 0.127 .0024 .0166 .0038 .0009
Note: CAR= abnormal returns cumulated over the two-day period ending on the earnings announcement date.
UE= unexpected earnings per share, deflated by share price at the end of the third month preceding the month in
which earnings were announced.
Beta= slope coefficient from a regression of firmi ’s dividend-adjusted return on the equal-weighted market index
over the 100-day period ending 60 days prior to the earnings announcement date.
Persistence= slope coefficient from a regression of Value Line’s revision in firmi ’s quartert +1 forecast on firm
i ’s quartert unexpected earnings.
Predictability= variance of firmi ’s unexpected earnings.
T-Bill = one-month Treasury Bill return.
Term= the difference between the montht yield on the Aaa corporate bond portfolio and the 1-month Treasury
bill rate.
Default= the difference between the montht yield on a portfolio of corporate bonds and the montht yield on a
portfolio of Aaa bonds.
Div Yield = the dividend yield on the equal-weighted NYSE portfolio.
sions (when economic growth rates are high) than in recessions (when economic growth
rates are low). In Hypothesis 2A it is argued that, ceteris paribus, cyclical variation in
the financing opportunity set implies that earnings will be more persistent during a credit
crunch (when the level of economic activity is high) than during a period of reliquifi-
cation (when the level of economic activity is low). As Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate,
the four stages of the business cycle on which the two hypotheses are based overlap.
Thus, the hypotheses are tested together via a pooled time-series, cross-sectional regres-
sion in which actual quarterly earnings per share in periodt , EPSt, is regressed on actual
quarterly earnings per share lagged four quarters,EPSt−4, and indicator variables that al-
low the regression intercept and slope coefficient to vary across the four stages of the
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Table 4.Sample means by stage of the business cycle. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
State of the Economya
Variablesb All
Expansion Recession Crunch Reliquification States
CAR
0.0014∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0009
(0.0422) (0.0452) (0.0432) (0.0461) (0.0428)
UE
−0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗∗ −0.0022
(0.0152) (0.0192) (0.0155) (0.0189) (0.0160)
T-Bill
0.0060∗∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗∗ 0.0063
(0.0060) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Term
0.0281∗∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗∗ 0.0262
(0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0128) (0.0105) (0.0166)
Default
0.0053∗∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗∗ 0.0058
(0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0038)
Div Yield
0.0023∗∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗∗ 0.0024
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Note:
aRecession, expansion, crunch, and reliquification as defined by Data Resources, Inc. (see
Table 1).
bSee Table 3 for variable definitions.
∗∗∗∗ = Mean is significantly different from the mean across all states at the 0.0001 level.
∗∗∗ = Mean is significantly different from the mean across all states at the 0.001 level.
∗∗ = Mean is significantly different from the mean across all states at the 0.01 level.
∗ = Mean is significantly different from the mean across all states at the 0.1 level.
business cycle:
EPSt = α0+ α∗1EPSt−4+ α∗2EPS∗t−4EXPt + α∗3EPS∗t−4CRUNCHt
+ α∗4EPS∗t−4RELIQt + α∗5EXPt + α∗6CRUNCHt + α∗7RELIQt + εt, (4)
EPSt = actual earnings per share in quartert , as initially reported in the
Value Line Investment Survey,
EXPt = a dummy variable equal to 1.0 if earnings are announced during a
period predicted to be an expansion by one-quarter ahead forecasts
from the DRI model,
CRUNCHt = a dummy variable equal to 1.0 if earnings are announced during a
period labeled by DRI as a credit crunch, and
RELIQt = a dummy variable equal to 1.0 if earnings are announced during a
period labeled by DRI as a reliquification.
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Table 5. Tests of hypotheses 1A and 2A: regression analysis of
variation in earnings persistence across business cycle stages.
(4) EPSt = α0 + α∗1EPSt−4 + α∗2EPS∗t−4EXPt
+α∗3EPS∗t−4CRUNCHt + α∗4EPS∗t−4RELIQt
+α∗5EXPt + α∗6CRUNCHt + α∗7RELIQt + εt.
Explanatory Variables Coefficients (p-values)

















Adj. R2 0.586 0.587
F-test of the Hypothesis thatEPS∗t−4CRUNCH= EPS∗t−4RELIQ
Difference in Coefficients 0.038
F-Statistic 30.201
p-value (.0001)
The coefficientsα2, α3, andα4 allow the earnings persistence coefficient to shift across
stages of the business cycle, and the coefficientsα5, α6, andα7 allow the intercept to shift
across stages of the business cycle. Since each quarterly earnings occurs during either
a recession or an expansion, only two of the three variablesEPSt−4, EPS∗t−4REC, and
EPS∗t−4EXP can be included in the same equation without redundancy. The selection of
EPSt−4 andEPS∗t−4EXPfor inclusion impliesα2 > 0 as a test of Hypothesis 1A. In contrast,
the credit crunch and reliquification stages do not span all earnings announcement dates,
implying thatEPS∗t−4CRUNCHandEPS
∗
t−4RELIQshould be entered into the equation along
with EPSt−4. Thus, Hypothesis 2A implies thatα3 > α4.
Results from the estimation of this equation are reported as Model 2 in Table 5. (Model 1
is a benchmark model that excludes business cycle effects.) In support of Hypothesis 1A,
the slope coefficient onEPS∗t−4EXPt, α2, is positive (0.032) and significant (p = 0.0001).
Thus, consistent with the prediction that earnings persistence is positively associated with
the rate of economic growth, earnings are more persistent in economic expansions than in
recessions. In support of Hypothesis 2A, the slope coefficient onEPS∗t−4CRUNCHt, α3, is
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estimated to be 0.034 and is significantly larger than the slope coefficient onEPS∗t−4RELIQt,
α4, which is estimated to be−0.004. Consistent with the prediction that earnings persistence
is positively associated with the level of economic activity, earnings are more persistent
during the credit crunch periods that occur around business cycle peaks than during the
reliquification periods that occur around business cycle troughs.
4.2. Tests of Hypotheses 1B and 2B: Time-Variation in Earnings Response Coefficients
across Business Cycle Stages
Since earnings persistence is positively related to both economic growth rates and the level
of economic activity, the response of equity returns to quarterly earnings announcements
is also expected to be positively related to economic growth rates (Hypothesis 1B) and
the level of economic activity (Hypothesis 2B). To examine variation in earnings response
coefficients across business cycle stages, I estimate a regression equation in which cumu-
lative abnormal returns are expressed as a function of unexpected earnings and indicator
variables that allow the regression intercept and slope coefficient to vary across business
cycle stages:
CARit = α0+ α∗1EXPt + α∗2CRUNCHt + α∗3RELIQt + α∗4UEit
+ α∗5UE∗itEXPt + α∗6UE∗i CRUNCHt + α∗7UE∗itRELIQt + εit (5)
where:
CARit = abnormal returns for firmi at timet , cumulated over a two-day window ending
on the earnings announcement date,
UEit = unexpected earnings for firmi at time t , scaled by price at timet − 1, and
other variables are as defined above.
Pearson correlation coefficients between key variables to be used in the regression anal-
ysis are displayed in Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns are positively correlated with
earnings forecast errors (ρ = 0.22), while earnings persistence is negatively correlated with
earnings predictability (ρ = −0.27). With the exception of correlations among the dis-
count rate proxies, other pair-wise correlations are small. Correlations among the discount
rate proxies parallel those reported by Fama and French (1989). Although not reported in
Table 6, correlations among the variables do not vary across the four stages of the business
cycle.
The primary tests of Hypotheses 1B and 2B are reported as Model 2 of Table 7. (As
before, Model 1 is a benchmark model that omits business cycle effects.) Results from this
test strongly support both hypotheses. The coefficient onUE∗EXP, 0.105, is greater than
zero at thep = 0.0002 level. Thus, consistent with an increase in the aggregate availability
of investment opportunities, earnings response coefficients are larger in expansions than
in recessions (Hypothesis 1B). An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficient on
UE∗CRUNCH, 0.181, equals the coefficient onUE∗RELIQ, 0.076, at thep = 0.0005 level.
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Table 6.Pearson correlation coefficients. (Two-tailedp-values in parentheses.)
Variables UE Beta Persistence Predictability T-Bill Term Default Div Yield
CAR .22 .01 .01 −.01 −.01 −.01 −.02 −.02
(.00) (.17) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
UE −.02 .05 −.04 .00 −.05 −.04 −.05
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.73) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Beta .03 −.02 −.00 .03 .01 .04
(.00) (.00) (.97) (.00) (.01) (.00)
Persistence −.27 .02 .02 .04 −.03
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Predictability −.01 −.00 −.02 −.04
(.02) (.85) (.00) (.00)






Thus, consistent with a decrease in the aggregate availability of financing opportunities
in credit crunch periods, earnings response coefficients are larger than in reliquification
periods, when financing is more readily available (Hypothesis 2B). These results parallel
those from the earnings persistence tests. Like earnings persistence coefficients, earnings
response coefficients vary positively with the rate of economic growth and the level of
economic activity.
In Table 8, I examine the sensitivity of the results reported in Table 7 to the inclusion of
controls for other known determinants of earnings response coefficients. These ERC deter-
minants include cross-sectional variation in firm characteristics that influence the magnitude
of the response of equity returns to earnings announcements (i.e., firm-level earnings per-
sistence and firm-level earnings predictability), time varying components of the discount
rate (i.e., the T-Bill rate, the term premium, the default premium, and the dividend yield),
and time variation in each firm’s equity beta. When interaction terms that allow the slope
coefficient on unexpected earnings to vary with these controls are added to Equation 5, the
model becomes:
CARit = α0+ α∗1UEit + α∗2UE∗itEXPt + α∗3UE∗itCRUNCHt
+ α∗4UE∗itRELIQt + α∗5UE∗itPersistencei + α∗6UE∗itPredictabilityi
+ α∗7UE∗itT–Billt + α∗8UE∗itTermt
+ α∗9UE∗t Defaultt + α∗10UE∗t DivYieldt + α∗11UE∗itBETAit
+ α∗12EXPt + α∗13CRUNCHt + α∗14RELIQt + εt (6)
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Table 7. Tests of hypotheses 1B and 2B: regression analysis of
the relation between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected
earnings per share across business cycle stages.
(5) CARt = α0 + α∗1UEt + α∗2UE∗t EXPt + α∗3UE∗t CRUNCHt+α∗4UE∗t RELIQt + α∗5EXPt+α∗6CRUNCHt + α∗7RELIQt + εt.
Explanatory Variables Coefficients (p-values)

















Adj. R2 0.047 0.048
F-test of the Hypothesis thatUE∗CRUNCH= UE∗RELIQ




Beta = slope coefficient from a regression of firmi ’s dividend adjusted return
on the equal-weighted market index over the 100-day period ending 60
days prior to the earnings announcement date,
Persistence= slope coefficient from a regression of Value Line’s revision in firmi ’s
quartert + 1 forecast on firmi ’s quartert unexpected earnings,
Predict= variance of firmi ’s unexpected earnings,
T-Bill = one-month Treasury bill return,
Term = the difference between the montht yield on the Aaa corporate bond
portfolio and the one-month Treasury bill rate,
Default = the difference between the montht yield on a portfolio of corporate
bonds and the montht yield on a portfolio of Aaa bonds, and
Div Yield = the dividend yield on the equal-weighted NYSE portfolio.
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Results from a baseline regression that excludes business cycle effects are reported as
Model 1 in Table 8. Each of the six ERC determinants is of the predicted sign, and all but
equity beta are significant. Consistent with the argument that the present value of revisions
in future cash flows implied by the forecast error is negatively associated with the discount
rate, earnings response coefficients are negatively associated with the three discount rate
components. Additionally, ERCs are increasing (decreasing) in firm-level measures of
earnings persistence (earnings predictability).
Model 2 examines whether Hypothesis 1B and Hypothesis 2B continue to hold after
controlling for cross-sectional determinants of ERCs and time-series variation in ERCs at-
tributable to time-varying discount rates. The coefficient onUE∗EXP, 0.049, is significantly
larger than zero (p = 0.0654). While the coefficient onUE∗CRUNCH, 0.172, is larger than
the coefficient onUE∗RELIQ, 0.115, the difference is not significant (p = 0.2089). Sensi-
tivity analyses not reported in Table 8 indicate that the loss of significance is attributable to
the discount rate variables, as opposed to earnings persistence, earnings predictability, or
equity beta. When the latter three variables are included without controls for the discount
rate components, inferences are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7. Since
time-variation in the four discount rate components captures variation in the aggregate in-
vestment and financing opportunity set underlying the two hypotheses, the time varying
components of the discount rate can be viewed as an alternative operationalization of the
two hypotheses. Thus, the lack of support for one of the two hypotheses is not surprising,
particularly in light of the fact that the business cycle dummy variables are dichotomous,
while the time-varying interest rate components provide a continuous measure of changing
business conditions.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Intertemporal instability in earnings response coefficients has led some to question the
usefulness of accounting earnings in explaining current returns (Lev, 1989). This pa-
per extends prior research on the determinants of earnings response coefficients by us-
ing macroeconomic theory to predict how changes in the aggregate investing and financ-
ing opportunity sets affect earnings persistence and, in turn, the earnings-returns rela-
tion. The study is also relevant to students of financial statement analysis, who are con-
cerned about documenting contextual regularities in the market’s interpretation of earnings
announcements.
Results from a sample of 53,324 quarterly earnings announcements by Value Line firms
over the period 1970–87 support the hypothesis that earnings persistence varies with busi-
ness conditions. Consistent with an increase in the availability of investment opportunities
during expansionary periods, earnings persistence is significantly greater during expan-
sions than during recessions. Consistent with a decrease in the aggregate availability of
external financing when credit is tight, earnings persistence is significantly greater dur-
ing credit crunch periods than during reliquification periods. Greater earnings persistence
implies larger earnings response coefficients. Accordingly, earnings response coefficients
are larger in expansions (credit crunch periods) than in recessions (reliquification periods).
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Table 8. Tests of hypotheses 1B and 2B: regression analysis of the relation
between cumulative abnormal returns, unexpected earnings per share, forecast
error-ERC determinant interactions, and forecast error-discount rate determi-
nant interactions across business cycle stages.
(6) CARt = α0 + α∗1UEt + α∗2UE∗t EXPt + α∗3UE∗t CRUNCHt+α∗4UE∗t RELIQt + α∗5EXPt + α∗6CRUNCHt + α∗7RELIQt+6α∗j UE∗t ERC Determinants+6α∗kUE∗t Rate Determinants
+α∗l UE∗t Equity Beta+ εt.
Explanatory Variables Coefficients (p-values)































Adj. R2 0.052 0.053
F-test of the hypothesis thatUE∗CRUNCH= UE∗RELIQ
Difference in Coefficients 0.057
F-Statistic 1.488
p-value (0.2089)
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Thus, earnings persistence and earnings response coefficients are positively related to both
the level of economic growth and the level of economic activity. Earnings response coef-
ficients also vary across the business cycle with time-variation in the discount rate. While
time-varying discount rates subsume variation in ERCs with variation in the financing op-
portunity set, the variation in ERCs associated with variation in the investment opportunity
set is not fully captured by time-variation in discount rates.
Four general conclusions follow from these results. First, the results imply that intertem-
poral variation in ERCs is not completely driven by random noise and/or measurement error.
A significant portion, in fact, can be attributed to changing business conditions. Thus, these
results enhance our belief in the usefulness of earnings in firm valuation. Second, these
results imply that earnings provide information about both a firm’s ability to find/exploit
profitable investment opportunitiesand its ability to finance existing projects. Thus, these
results further our understanding of how the market uses earnings information to value
firms. Third, these results have implications for the design of future information content
studies. The finding that ERCs vary over time as a function of time-varying expected returns
suggests that interest rates should be included in models whenever there is intertemporal
pooling of observations or whenever inferences about changes in ERCs across time due
to non-interest rate factors (e.g., a change in accounting method) are hypothesized. Fi-
nally, although these results indicate that a firm’s investment and financing opportunity sets
are significant explanators of cross-sectional variation in ERCs, the addition of business
cycle variables to earnings-returns regressions does not result in a significant increase in
modelR2s.
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Notes
1. Recent evidence presented by Miron (1990) and Barsky and Miron (1989) suggests that business cycles and
seasonal cycles are generated by similar types of exogenous shocks, are characterized by similar stylized facts,
and share similar propagation mechanisms. Thus, these hypotheses parallel those developed by Salamon and
Stober (1994), who demonstrate that earnings response coefficients are positively associated with seasonalities
in the level of quarterly earnings.
2. See also Moore and Klein (1985), Zarnowitz (1985), Zarnowitz and Moore (1984), Moore (1983), Burns
(1969), Hultgren (1965), Mitchell (1951), and Burns and Mitchell (1946) for a more detailed discussion.
3. DRI’s model has been criticized for its Keynesian assumptions. Further, Nelson (1972) documents that fore-
casts from simple time series models are as accurate as forecasts from large econometric models. Consequently,
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hypotheses were also tested using one-quarter ahead forecasts from the six-equation vector autoregression de-
tailed in Webb (1991). In all cases, qualitatively similar results were obtained.
4. DRI does not forecast credit crunch and reliquification periods. To (ex-post) define the credit crunch and
reliquification stages, DRI uses seven measures of credit market conditions. These seven ratios include:
a) aggregate commercial loans outstanding/demand and time deposits; b) aggregate debt/total equity of nonfi-
nancial companies; c) short-term loans/total debt of nonfinancial companies; d) interest charges on debt/cash
flow of nonfinancial companies; e) current assets/current liabilities of nonfinancial companies; f) household
assets/household liabilities; and g) mortgage repayments by households/household disposable income. They
parallel those used by other researchers to measure credit market conditions (e.g., Srini Vasan, 1986; Dubofsky,
1985; Sealey, 1979).
5. Empirical evidence on the importance of the financial stages of the business cycle (i.e., the credit crunch
and reliquification) has also been provided by: a) Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983), who show that fi-
nancial factors were important determinants of the Great Depression’s depth and persistence; and b) Sims
(1980) and Litterman and Weiss (1985) who suggest that financial variables other than the money supply
have significant explanatory power for output. Theoretical models have been developed by: a) Scheinkman
and Weiss (1986), who show how borrowing constraints increase the variability of consumption, output and
employment; b) Farmer (1985), who shows that information asymmetries magnify the impact of interest
rates on output; and c) Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who show that procyclical movements in net worth
magnify investment and output fluctuations. See Gertler (1988) for a review of these and other related
papers.
6. The ERC predictions are analogous to those of Salamon and Stober (1994), who examine variation in the
earnings-returns relation associated with seasonal variation in the level of firm production. Barsky and Miron
(1989) and Miron (1990) present evidence that business cycles are similar to seasonal cycles in that they display
similar stylized facts (i.e., the co-movement of output across sectors, the absence of production smoothing,
the co-movement of nominal money and real output, and the procyclicality of labor input). The similarity
of these stylized facts suggests that similar propagation mechanisms are at work. Similarities in the causes
and consequences of seasonal and business cycles suggest similarities in the impact on earnings response
coefficients.
7. The hypotheses developed in this paper predict variation in earnings response coefficients across business cycle
stages as a result of time-variation in the magnitude of revisions to expected future earnings in response to an
earnings shock. Of course, earnings response coefficients also vary inversely with the discount rate (Collins
and Kothari, 1989) and discount rates vary across business cycle stages (Fama, 1990; Fama and French, 1989).
Consequently, subsequent tests of the ERC hypotheses include controls for time-variation in discount rates.
8. Three types of imperfections characterize the equity markets. First, transactions costs are high (Smith (1977)).
Second, there is a tax advantage to internal retention. Third, information asymmetries create a “market
for lemons” problem (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss, 1984). Three types of
imperfections also characterize debt markets. First, as a result of financial distress costs, the marginal cost of
debt increases with leverage. Second, managers may act counter to the interests of creditors, creating agency
costs. Third, “lemons” distortions exist (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Calomaris and Hubbard, 1990).
9. Empirical evidence on the sensitivity of investment activity to financial liquidity is provided by Fazzari and
Athey (1987), who document that firm-level investment expenditures are considerably more sensitive to a
firm’s ability to internally generate funds than a frictionless neoclassical model of investment would predict.
10. In the late 1990s, borrowing by U.S. companies has shifted from banks to the capital markets. Recent evidence
suggests that this shift has increased the severity of credit crunches. (See, e.g.,Wall Street Journal, 1998).
11. T-Bill was obtained from Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1990). The components of DivYield, Default and Term
were obtained from Ibbotson Associates through John Kling.
12. Time-varying discount rates do not contradict the idea of rational pricing by an efficient market. For example,
Balvers, Cosimano, and McDonald (1990) present a dynamic general equilibrium model which gives rise to
predictable stock returns due to serial correlation in aggregate output. Investors are assumed to desire a constant
level of consumption over time. When aggregate output (i.e., wealth) is high, consumption is low relative
to wealth, and even low expected rates of return induce high savings. In contrast, when aggregate wealth is
low, consumption is high relative to wealth and only high expected returns will induce savings. Variation in
expected returns associated with variation in business conditions will not be eliminated by arbitrage. Arbitrage,
for example, investing when returns are high (and wealth is low), can only occur by increasing the variance of
consumption, thus lowering utility.
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13. Relatedly, Board and Walker (1990) demonstrate that ERCs vary intertemporally with unanticipated inflation.
The analysis in this paper does not attempt to control for time-variation in ERCs arising from shocks to expected
returns. Since the analysis uses a short, two-day event window, shocks to expected returns are less apt to be a
problem than would be the case if a longer event window had been selected.
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